This article is cited in 2 papers

Applied mathematics

Two-stage network games modeling the Belt and Road Initiative

P. Suna^a, E. M. Parilina^a, H. W. Gaob<sup>b

a</sup> St Petersburg State University, 7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation
^b Qingdao University, School of Mathematics and Statistics, 308, Ningxia Road, Qingdao, 266071, People's Republic of China

Abstract: Inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, we introduce a model of two-stage network games, when players first form a directed network (the first stage) and then they may reconsider the actions made at the first stage and choose controls to influence other players in a positive or negative way (the second stage). At both stages players get their payoffs. Considering a cooperative version of the game, we examine the problem of subgame network consistency and design an imputation distribution procedure as a new system of stage payments to guarantee the long-term cooperation. The Shapley value with exogenous directed graph constraint is used as a cooperative solution concept. Finally, we prove that a cooperative subgame is convex which ensures the non-emptiness of the core.

Keywords: network games, subgame consistency, imputation distribution procedure, the Shapley value, directed graph, convex game.

UDC: 519.83

MSC: 91A25

Received: July 28, 2021
Accepted: February 1, 2022

Language: English

DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu10.2022.107