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JOURNALS // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Seriya 10. Prikladnaya Matematika. Informatika. Protsessy Upravleniya // Archive

Vestnik S.-Petersburg Univ. Ser. 10. Prikl. Mat. Inform. Prots. Upr., 2019 Volume 15, Issue 1, Pages 39–46 (Mi vspui388)

This article is cited in 1 paper

Applied mathematics

Stochastic game of data transmission in the presence of buffers of finite capacity

V. M. Bure, E. M. Parilina

St. Petersburg State University, 7-9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation

Abstract: The game-theoretic model of data transmission in a network of a given topology is presented. Two players (network nodes) tend to send as many random data packagesas possible to the final nodes through one common node. Each playerhas a finite capacity buffer for storing data packages. A system of costs for sending and storing data packages andrewards for the successful package delivery is introduced. A dynamic conflict-controlled process is modelled as a stochastic gamewith a finite set of states. The existence of the Nash equilibrium and a cooperative solution is proved. The cooperative solution is a strategy profile which maximizes the total expected payoff. The price of anarchy in the network is calculated. The price comparesthe players' payoffs in the Nash equilibrium and cooperative solution.

Keywords: data transmission, slotted ALOHA, the price of anarchy, stochastic game.

UDC: 519.83

MSC: 91A15

Received: October 18, 2018
Accepted: December 18, 2018

Language: English

DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu10.2019.103



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