This article is cited in 1 paper

Control in Social and Economic Systems

True and false information equilibrium in the model of trading system

G. Algazin, J. Algazina

Altai State University

Abstract: The paper formulates and investigates the conditions for the existence of informative equilibrium in competitive commodity market under the assumptions of a wrong mutual awareness among competitors. Our framework is a multi-agent model of the trading network “center (manufacturer) – agents (mediators) –consumers” with linear inverse demand function and cost functions, and agents can act either by Cournot or Stackelberg. The center reveals the information about its objective function as an information impact on agents. The obtained results are discussed.

Keywords: trading network, reflexive game, imperfect information, information equilibrium, Cournot equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium and disequilibrium, information impact.

UDC: 519.865 + 339.13
BBK: 22.18 + 65.42

Received: November 22, 2015
Published: March 31, 2016

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