This article is cited in 3 papers

Asymmetry in a cooperative bioresource management problem

V. V. Mazalov, A. N. Rettieva

Institute of Applied Mathematical Research Karelian Research Centre of RAS

Abstract: Discrete-time game-theoretic models related to a bioresource management problem (fishery) with asymmetric players are investigated. Players use different discount factors and have different random planning horizons. The main goal here is to construct the value function for the cooperative solution and to distribute the joint payoff among the players in asymmetric cases. We propose using the Nash bargaining solution to obtain cooperative profits and strategies. It is shown that cooperative behavior determined by bargaining schemas is not the only profitable one for players but is better for ecology.

Keywords: bioresource management problem, asymmetric players, Nash bargaining solution.

UDC: 519.833.2
BBK: 22.18

Bibliographic databases:

•