This article is cited in 12 papers

Control in Social and Economic Systems

Efficient solution of allotment problem with Groves–Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility

N. A. Korgin, V. O. Korepanov

Institute of Control Sciences of RAS

Abstract: We consider a problem of allocation of limited amount of divisible good among a finite number of agents under transferable utility. We design a mechanism which implements a Pareto efficient allocation as a Nash equilibrium of the induced game. This mechanism is an adaptation of the Groves–Ledyard “quadratic government” that was initially offered for the problem of public good.

Keywords: mechanism design, Nash implementation, allotment problem.

UDC: 519
BBK: 32.81

 English version: Automation and Remote Control, 2016, 77:5, 914–942

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