This article is cited in 2 papers

Control in Medicine, Biology, and Ecology

Cooperative incentive condition in bioresource sharing problem

Anna Rettieva

Institute of Applied Mathematical Research Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk

Abstract: The discrete-time game model for bio-resource management problem (fish catching) is considered. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors, and the players (countries) capture the fish. We assume that there is a migratory exchange between the regions of the reservoir. The Nash and cooperative equilibria are obtained for infinite planning horizon. Time-consistent imputation distribution procedure is considered as a method for cooperation maintenance. The new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperation is introduced and called “incentive cooperative condition”.

Keywords: dynamic games, bio-resource management problem, cooperative equilibrium, time-consistency, imputation distribution procedure.

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