Abstract:
The paper presents the modified model of interaction between corrupted empowered hierarchy and civil society. Modifications consist in amplified definitions of damage from corruption and value of total corruption suppression, in consideration of different types of bureaucrats' reaction on anti-corruption policies, and also in stating more adequate boundary conditions for the equations of the model. Basing on the modified model, relative efficiencies of different anticorruption strategies are computed for hierarchies of different topology and behavioral characteristics, including intensity of social influence. It is found that, under the assumptions of the model, the most effective strategy for low-branched hierarchies is corruption suppression among the lowest part of the hierarchy. For hierarchies with high branching degree the suppression of the highest part is the most effective. Hierarchies with strong centralization turn out to be the most sensitive to the strategy choice. It is shown that the more social influence on the instances' power level is, comparing to power redistribution intensity inside the hierarchy, — the more effective is the suppression of the lowest hierarchical part, compared to the suppression of the highest. A brief comparison of traditional game-theoretical approach to mathematical investigation of corruption and system-social approach, presented in this and earlier papers, is also given.
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