This article is cited in 1 paper

Game-theoretic model of agents' interaction in a two-stage market with a random factor

Alexander A. Vasin, Ekaterina A. Daylova

Moscow State University

Abstract: We examine a game-theoretic model of a two-stage market with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs are risk-neutral and operate in the conditions of perfect competition. A random factor affects the outcome in the spot market. Thus, the spot price is a random value. We determine the optimal strategies for consumers, producers, and arbitrageurs. We analyze the dependence of producers' market power on parameters of the model. The results show that introduction of the forward market substantially reduces the market power of producers.

Keywords: forward market, subgame perfect equilibrium, Cournot oligopoly.

UDC: 519.83
BBK: 22.18

 English version: Automation and Remote Control, 2014, 75:9, 1677–1688

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