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JOURNALS // Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya // Archive

Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 2022 Volume 14, Issue 1, Pages 3–20 (Mi mgta294)

Sequential equilibria in signaling games

Alexander A. Vasin, Irina Yu. Seregina

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics

Abstract: The paper considers Bayesian multi-stage signaling games. Previously formulated for extensive-form games, concepts of sequential equilibrium, separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium are specified, and calculating methods for these equilibria are also discussed. A competitive collision model with signals indicating rivals’ states is studied as a specific example. We determine conditions for existence of separating and pooling equilibria with ordered competition, in which the competition object goes to one of the rivals without a rigid encounter. Model parameters ranges of the equilibria existence are also determined.

Keywords: multi-stage game, signaling game, ordered competition, separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium.

UDC: 519.83
BBK: 22.18

Received: 19.06.2021
Revised: 26.08.2021
Accepted: 10.12.2021



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© Steklov Math. Inst. of RAS, 2026