This article is cited in 3 papers

Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games

Fengyan Sun^ab, Elena M. Parilina^abc, Hongwei Gao<sup>b

a</sup> Saint Petersburg State University
^b School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University
^c Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong

Abstract: Cooperative games with coalition structures are considered and a principle of coalition structure individual stability with respect to some cooperative solution concepts is determined. In comparison with the paper (Sedakov et al., 2013), we consider the opportunity of the players to block the deviation of a player in case their payoffs decrease with the deviation. We prove the existence of an individually stable coalition structure with respect to the Shapley and equal surplus division values for the case of three-person games according to the new definition of a stable coalition structure.

Keywords: coalition structure, stability, the Shapley value, the ES-value.

UDC: 519.834
BBK: 22.18

Received: 24.12.2018
Revised: 18.03.2019
Accepted: 20.03.2019

 English version: Automation and Remote Control, 2021, 82:6, 1083–1094