This article is cited in 1 paper

Atomic Routing Game with Capacity Constraints

Darya A. Paltseva^ab, Andrey P. Parfyonov<sup>ba

a</sup> Institute for Problems of Regional Economics RAS
^b Saint-Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes

Abstract: A model of an atomic routing game is considered. A network in this model has capacity constraints. Players in this game choose routes from some sources to one sink. The cost of passing each arc is determined by an increasing and convex function that depends on the number of players. Algorithms for finding the Nash equilibrium and social optimum are developed. These algorithms have a polynomial time complexity. The model can be used for transport networks with limited traffic flows.

Keywords: network games, routing games, network flows, Nash equilibrium, algorithm for finding equilibrium.

UDC: 519.833.2

MSC: 22.18

 English version: Automation and Remote Control, 2019, 80:10, 1901–1911