Cooperative incentive condition in bioresource management problem

Anna Rettieva

Institute of Applied Mathematical Research Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk

Abstract: The discrete-time game model related with the bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game. We assume that there is a migratory exchange between the regions of the reservoir. The Nash and cooperative equilibria are obtained for infinite planning horizon. Time-consistent imputation distribution procedure is considered as a method for maintenance the cooperation. The new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperation is introduced and we call it incentive cooperative condition.

Keywords: dynamic games, bioresource management problem, cooperative equilibrium, time-consistency, imputation distribution procedure.

UDC: 519.837 + 517.977
BBK: 22.18

Bibliographic databases:

•