Symmetric Nash equilibrium arrivals to queuing system

Julia V. Chirkova

Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Centre of RAS, Pushkinskaya str., 11, Petrozavodsk, Karelia, 185910, Russia

Abstract: We consider a game-theoretic setting for the queuing system models where input process of arrivals is strategic. This paper generalizes a methodology for the symmetric Nash equilibrium exploring in queuing system with loss. We assume that the system admits customer requests at the time interval $[0,T]$. Each of customers chooses the moment to send his request into the system maximizing his payoff. Several models of certain systems are presented as examples demonstrating a result of the methodology application.

Keywords: queueing system, strategic customers, optimal arrivals, Kolmogorov backward equations, Nash equilibrium.

Language: English

DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2023.03