Dynamic games with incomplete knowledge in metric spaces

Igor Konnov

Kazan Federal University, Department of System Analysis and Information Technologies, 18, ul. Kremlevskaya, Kazan, 420008, Russia

Abstract: We describe a model of a discrete time dynamic system with active elements (players) and states in a metric space. Each state is associated with the common utility value and player shares. Coalitions of players can change the system state, but each move requires their expenses. The players may have only restricted and local knowledge about the system. We define the concept of an equilibrium state in this dynamic game and present iterative algorithms that create feasible trajectories tending to equilibrium states under rather general conditions.

Keywords: dynamic games, discrete time, incomplete knowledge, utility shares distributions, equilibrium states, solution trajectories.

Language: English

DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.09

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