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JOURNALS // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Archive

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2014 Volume 7, Pages 254–261 (Mi cgtm236)

Competition form of bargaining

Tatyana E. Nosalskaya

Zabaikalsky Institute of Railway Transport, Department of Higher Mathematics and Applied Informatics, Magistralnaya str. 11, Chita, 672040, Russia

Abstract: We consider the noncooperative zero-sum game, related with the competitions. Players submit the competition projects, that are characterized by a finite set of parameters. The arbitrator or arbitration committee uses a stochastic procedure with the probability distribution to determine the most preferred project. This distribution is known to all participants. Payoff ot the winner depend on the parameters of his project. The three-dimensional mathematical model of this problem is constructed, which is then extended to the multi-dimensional case. The equilibria in the games with four and $n$ persons are found, as well as the corresponding payoffs are computed.

Keywords: Model of competition, bargaining, stochastic procedure, n-person game, Nash equilibrium.

Language: English



© Steklov Math. Inst. of RAS, 2026