Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games

Henk Folmer^a, Pierre von Mouche<sup>b

a</sup> Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Landleven 1, 9747 AD, Groningen, The Netherlands
^b Wageningen Universiteit, Hollandseweg 1, 6700 EW, Wageningen, The Netherlands

Abstract: We deal with the linkage of infinitely repeated games. Results are obtained by analysing the relations between the feasible individually rational payoff regions of the isolated games and the linked game. In fact we have to handle geometric problems related to Minkowski sums, intersections and Pareto boundaries of convex sets.

Keywords: asymmetries, convex set, feasible individually rational payoff region, Folk theorem, full cooperation, linking, Minkowski sum, Pareto boundary, tensor game.

Language: English