This article is cited in 4 papers

Control in Social Economic Systems

Axiomatics for power indices that account for player preferences

D. A. Shvarts

State University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Abstract: We offer a general approach to describing power indices that account for preferences as suggested by F. Aleskerov. We construct two axiomatizations of these indices. Our construction generalizes the Laruelle–Valenciano axioms for Banzhaf (Penrose) and Shapley–Shubik indices. We obtain new sets of axioms for these indices, in particular, sets without the anonymity axiom.

PACS: 02.50.Le

Presented by the member of Editorial Board: F. T. Aleskerov

Received: 05.03.2009

 English version: Automation and Remote Control, 2010, 71:1, 128–141

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