This article is cited in 1 paper

Control in Social Economic Systems

War of attrition with incomplete information and fuzzy players' types

A. S. Shvedov

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Abstract: The result on existence of a pure-strategy symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the war of attrition is generalized for fuzzy players' actions and types.

Keywords: games with incomplete information, fuzzy sets, fuzzy random variables, Bayesian Nash equilibria.

Presented by the member of Editorial Board: F. T. Aleskerov

Received: 17.10.2019
Revised: 23.01.2020
Accepted: 30.01.2020

DOI: 10.31857/S0005231020070090

 English version: Automation and Remote Control, 2020, 81:7, 1279–1285

Bibliographic databases:

• 
• 
•