This article is cited in 17 papers

Control in Social Economic Systems

Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty

G. I. Algazin^a, Yu. G. Algazina<sup>b

a</sup> Altai State University, Barnaul, Russia
^b Polzunov Altai State Technical University, Barnaul, Russia

Abstract: A model of dynamic behavior in the Cournot market in the class of linear demand and cost functions of agents is presented. Observing the current state of the market and considering current economic restrictions, agents refine their outputs in game-to-game dynamics and take steps towards the current position of their goal. Sufficient conditions on the step sizes chosen by agents independently of each other under which the dynamics converge to the static Cournot–Nash equilibrium are established.

Keywords: oligopoly, incomplete awareness, reflexive behavior, Cournot–Nash equilibrium, convergence conditions.

Presented by the member of Editorial Board: D. A. Novikov

Received: 14.08.2018
Revised: 29.10.2019
Accepted: 28.11.2019

DOI: 10.31857/S0005231020020087

 English version: Automation and Remote Control, 2020, 81:2, 287–301

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