Control in Social Economic Systems

Nonmanipulatable insurance mechanisms: A design method

I. A. Ageev^a, T. I. Ovehinnikova<sup>b

a</sup> Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences
^b Moscow State Institute of Steel and Alloys (Technological University)

Abstract: Nonmanipulatable mechanisms for determining insurance penalty are studied under the assumption that insurance rates and reimbursements nonlinearly depend on the information supplied by insured parties on the probability of occurrence of an insured event. An optimal insurance mechanism by the maximum of the insurer aim function is determined.

Presented by the member of Editorial Board: D. A. Novikov

Received: 12.10.2004

 English version: Automation and Remote Control, 2005, 66:3, 427–433

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